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The international rule of law -  one of the most influential theoretical ideas of 
contemporary international legal scholarship At the same time, it exists in a ceaseless 
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Горобець KB. Міжнародне верховенство права у  дискурсі сумнівів. -  
Стаття
Міжнародне верховенство права -  одна з пайвпливовіших теоретичних 
ідей сучасної міжнародно-правової науки. У той же час, воно існує в 
безперервному дискурсі сумнівів і заперечень. Політичний реалізм і 
постмодерністський скепсис є двома основними причинами для сумнівів з цього 
приводу. Стаття присвячена аргументам, що ними представлені, а також 
можливим контраргументам, заснованим на ідеології формалізму.
Ключові слова: міжнародне верховенство права, політичний реалізм, 
юридичний інструменталізм, формалізм.
Горобец K.R. Международное верховенство права в дискурсе сомнений. -  
Статья
Международное верховенство права -  одна из самых влиятельных 
теоретических идей современной международно-правовой науки В то же время, 
оно существует в непрерывном дискурсе сомнений и возражений. Политический 
реализм и постмодернистский скепсис являются двумя основными причинами 
для сомнений по этому поводу. Статья посвящена аргу ментам, которые ими 
представлены, а также возможным контраріуменшм, основанным на идеологии 
формализма.
Юиочевые слова: международное верховенство права, политический 
реализм, юридический инструментализм, формализм.
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Introduction. The idea of the international rule of law is one of 
the most discussed theoretical issues, but at the same time one of the 
most controversial. This is partly because of the vagueness of the 
international rule of law itself, which often leads to the instinctive 
denial of its existence. However, the primary problem is that legal 
philosophy, which remains the central domain of the rule of law 
theories, cannot offer a relevant explanation scheme or even an 
approach that would make the rule of law ideas applicable in 
international legal theory. It stipulates the elaboration of plentiful 
particular theories of the international rule of law, that usually suit 
only one of its particular aspects. Alternatively, it calls forth the use of 
analogy with the domestic theory of the rule of law, which is not 
always (if ever) relevant.
Such a dissent from the international rule of law issues does not 
make a strong case for it. At the same time the increasing extent of 
references to the international rule of law (or to the rule of law at the 
international level) in normative acts, as well as in soft law, creates 
demands for its conceptual understanding. It does not seem, though, 
that conceptualizing the international rule of law should go beyond or 
outside the key patterns of the general theory of the rule of law, or, on 
the contrary, deduct the international rule of law directly from the 
domestic legal theory. This article represents an attempt of 
methodological analysis of how the international rule of law can be 
explained both from the side of legal philosophy and from the side of 
international law theory simultaneously.
Why does the Rule of Law Matter for International Law? 
The aim of this section is to examine the rising rule of law discourse 
at the international level. There is no doubt that modem international 
law tends to incorporate rule of law considerations into international 
legal reasoning and rule-making. Many international organizations of 
universal and regional character declare their adherence to the rule of 
law ideology and aspire to promote it both at the domestic and 
international level. However, the perpetual question of international 
legal theory is still there: does the rule of law at the international level 
mean something more than only a legitimative slogan, which rather
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has a political meaning? Taken broadly, the rule of law at the 
international level brings up the classical and incessant problem of the 
connection between international law and international politics. 
Nevertheless, two tendencies of the rule of law at the international 
level may be seen. First is the dissemination of the rule of law 
ideology among international organizations as a goal of their 
activities. Second is the continuing discrepancy among international 
legal scholars about the applicability of the rule of law to international 
realms. These two tendencies reflect two sides of the rising rule of law 
discourse and hence need to be considered attentively.
Rule o f  Law as a Part o f  International Legal Discourse. The 
relevance of the rule of law issues for the international legal system is 
widely seen in the conviction of the necessity of its promotion. 
Promotion of the rule of law at the domestic and international level is 
often seen as one of the core goals of the United Nations. The 
Secretary-General emphasized that “the ‘rule of law’ is a concept at 
the very heart of the Organization’s mission” [1]. This underlines that 
during the XX century and at the beginning of the XXI century the 
rule of law has gone a long way from being a theoretical concept of 
British constitutional law through the stage of philosophical 
considerations to gaining recognition as a basic idea of the 
functioning of today's legal systems. Such a transformation 
determines its significance for the international legal system. It 
appears, among other things, in the idea that the rule of law at the 
international level should become the primary vector of humanity’s 
development [2, p. 356; 3, p. 2].
From the viewpoint of legal philosophy, there can be no doubt 
that the idea of the rule of law is one of the most valuable 
achievements of the European civilization, as it has become one of the 
fundamental principles of modem law and an important concept of 
political and legal philosophy. Philosophical and theoretical 
justifications of the rule of law have been accompanying the Western 
tradition of legal thinking throughout the last two centuries, and in this 
aspect, the rule of law reflects the image of law that is common for 
contemporary jurisprudence.
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Apparently, the rule of law finds its most institutionalized form in 
domestic law, because it is the fundamental criterion of domestic legal 
systems’ effectiveness and legitimacy, especially in the Western legal 
tradition. Its ability to serve as a factor of legitimation of legal systems 
and evaluation of their effectiveness is widely reflected in 
international legal acts, especially adopted within the UN system. 
Indeed, the current references to the rule of law, which can be found in 
UN General Assembly resolutions and declarations (GA Res. 55/2 (8 
September 2000); GA Res. 61/39 (4 December 2006); GA Res. 62/70 
(6 December 2007); GA Res. 63/128 (11 December 2008), etc.) or in 
resolutions of the UN Security Council (SC Res. 1528, 27 February 
2004; SC Res. 2260, 20 January 2016; SC Res. 1542, 30 April 2004; 
SC Res. 1756, 15 May 2007; SC Res. 2268, 26 February 2016, etc.), 
as well as in statements of UN officials, reflect the importance of the 
promotion, restoration and strengthening of the rule of law as one of 
the UN’s main goals.
A well-known and widely spread definition of the rule of law is 
given by the UN Secretary-General, who said that the rule of law 
constitutes "a principle of governance in which all persons, 
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, 
are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally 
enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent 
with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as 
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of 
law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the 
application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision­
making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and 
legal transparency” [1, para. 6].
However, it is unclear whether the elements of the rule of law 
named by the Secretary-General are equally applicable to the 
domestic and international legal systems. Thus, R. McCorquodale 
supposes that "it is a statement about how the rule of law should 
operate in national systems and it is not a definition of the rule of law 
at the global level. It refers to the 'State itself' being accountable 
within its own system.” [4, p. 287] That seems to be one of the
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reasons why the international rule of law specifically is being referred 
to much more carefully. For instance, the Declaration of the High- 
Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the 
National and International Levels is less certain about the list of 
requirements of the rule of law at the international level, saying that 
"We recognize that the rule of law applies to all States equally, and to 
international organizations, including the United Nations and its 
principal organs, and that respect for and promotion of the rule of law 
and justice should guide all of their activities and accord predictability 
and legitimacy to their actions'’ [20].
Predictability and legitimacy are crucially important for the rule 
of law, but it is not confined to them. It is hard to see how the other 
principles of the rule of law mentioned by the Secretary-General (such 
as accountability to the law, separation of powers, avoidance of 
arbitrariness, etc.) can be directly built into the international legal 
system. It indicates that the rule of law is primarily important for 
states and domestic legal systems, as the rule of law principles cannot 
indisputably and without any simplifications be extrapolated onto the 
international legal system.
Thus, the main angle of the rule of law consideration at the 
international level is elaborating the standards of the rule of law and 
promoting them among states; practically, the rule of law is usually 
seen as a sphere of international cooperation, not as a part of the 
international legal system. Not only the context in which the rule of 
law is being mentioned in international legal acts, but also the non­
governmental organizations’ activities in indexing the rule of law 
(International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, World Justice 
Project, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Heritage Foundation, 
etc.) speak well of that the rule of law at the international level is 
being considered in the ‘top-down’ angle: from international rule of 
law standards — to their implementation in domestic law7.
However, there are several problems with understanding the 
entire concept of the ‘rule of law at the national and international 
levels’. Does this concept reflect two different phenomena or one? If 
the rule of law at the international level is an independent concept,
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what its content is? How can the domestic idea of the rule of law be 
extrapolated onto the international legal system? And finally, is it 
possible to speak about the international rule o f law as the set of 
principles and requirements to the international legal system instead of 
the rule o f law at the international level that seems to be an external 
descriptive concept? Answering these questions constitutes a major 
part of international legal theory. However, it still needs to be seen 
whether the rule of law at the international level is even possible.
Two Reasons for Doubts about the International Rule ofLaw. The 
idea of the international rule of law is often criticised from the 
standpoint of two approaches. The first one is legal instrumentalism 
(or instrumental approach to the law), which is presented in 
international theory, among others, by political realism. The second 
one is postmodern skepticism, which deconstructs the deep-seated 
structures of legal reasoning, discovering its vagueness and 
untenability [5, p. 391]. Both of these approaches either reject the idea 
of the international rule of law or substantiate the deep doubts about 
the possibility of such an international system which would confront 
even the simplest theories of legality (so called ’rule by law’ theories). 
Rule by law’ theories reflect the idea that even the worst political 
regimes can confront to the requirements of the rule of law simply by 
endowing the governance into the legal form. It usually means the 
obliteration of the core principles that determine the quality of laws 
[6]. Besides, the rule-of-law considerations are supposedly untenable 
in international law because of the use of analogy, which will be 
separately analyzed.
Instrumentalism and the International Rule o f Law. A reason for 
the skepticism about the international rule of law has a strong 
connection with the instrumental approach to the law as a whole and 
to international law specifically. The basic idea of such an approach is 
that law is treated only as a tool for reaching the goals set by political 
system. At the same time law is seen as having none of its own 
independent content, i.e., the content which is unaffected by political 
expediency. Indeed, the instrumental view of international law renders
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the definition of the international rule of law content and place in the 
international legal system impossible.
The application of the instrumental approach leads to two 
important conclusions. Firstly, the international rule of law as a goal is 
considered to be impossible to reach, because the institutions that 
create and enforce international law are too subordinated to political 
expediency. Without centralized rule-making international law is too 
uncertain and thus ineffective to a degree which is not permissible for 
a rule-of-law-govemed legal system. That means, first of all, that rule 
of law, either at the domestic level or at the international level, is an 
‘all or nothing' concept: if a legal system fails to conform to some of 
its requirements, it dismisses the entire possibility of the rule of law in 
such a legal system. International law, compared to domestic law, may 
be considered as institutionally insufficient in terms of law- 
enforcement and even law-making, and that increases international 
law's dependence on international politics. Practically, it leads to the 
legal and political impunity of powerful states, as they treat 
international law not as a normative delimiter of their behavior, but as 
the instrument for justifying policies and taking international law as a 
refugee in pursuing their interests [7, p. 7-10].
Secondly, the international rule of law is considered to be 
impossible even as a doctrine, as it is no more than an ideological 
stamp, which serves a cover for justification of international actors’ 
decisions and actions [5, p. 391]. An interesting point here is that this 
second aspect of the instrumental view of international law can 
paradoxically be used ‘for benefits’ of the rule of law reasoning. For 
instance, I. Hurd supposes that “international law [is] as a set of 
resources. This [...] recognizes that law contains the capacity to 
legitimate state policy. International law provides the resources with 
which states talk about and understand their behavior” [8, p. 46]. It 
leads him to the conclusion that “[governments use the categories and 
concepts provided by international law to explain their needs and their 
actions — these include ideas and rules around sovereignty, 
intervention, self-defense, humanitarian rescue, self-determination, 
and much more” [8, p. 45]. Hurd supposes that this particular function
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of international law serves to harbor the rule of law logic in its 
application to the international legal system (he calls it an integral 
model of legal and political legitimation).
It looks like Hurd does more bad than good for the international 
rule of law, linking it to the matter of justification. He actually 
substitutes the idea of legality (which is at the heart of the rule of law 
ideology) with the new version of raison d'Etat, saying, among other 
things, that “[t]he meaning of international legal rules arises from how 
it is invoked in the diplomacy of states.”[8, p. 46] It is no wonder that 
here international law turns out to be only a continuation of 
international politics, and what Hurd calls the ‘international rule of 
law’ is simply an external expression of political reasoning, which 
actually has very little in common with the rule of law ideology.
Postmodern Skepticism about the International Ride o f Law. 
Similar doubts, although differently grounded, can also be seen in 
postmodern interpretations of international law within their emphasis 
on its fundamental indeterminacy and constant reproducing of the 
internal discourses [9, p. 590-591]. Normative uncertainty provokes 
the reconsideration of the meaning of even the basic categories of the 
international order (such as human rights, development, peace, etc.). 
As Pauline Westerman argues, we can imagine the law as a 
matryoshka, where the biggest doll is one which constitutes the most 
abstract and equivocal idea. It helps to reach a compromise over the 
rules, although parties can interpret this idea in very different ways, 
thus no one can say what this idea is about [10, p. 181]. It leads to 
complete relativism, which gives no chances for the rule of law to be 
reached in the international legal system. Therefore, international law 
is too discursive for being certain enough to make the international 
rule of law possible.
In such conditions the concept and the content of the international 
rule of law is getting very blurred, uncertain and vague. On the one 
hand, it becomes commonly recognized that the international rule of 
law must be reached and strengthened, but on the other hand it is 
almost impossible to discover its requirements, as they dissipate in 
ceaseless contestations. That is why M. Koskenniemi considers the
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idea of the international rule of law in the context of political grounds 
of international law, emphasizing the impossibility of reduction of the 
rule of law to the ‘pure legal discourse’ because the international 
system does not and actually cannot elaborate one [9, p. 1].
From this perspective, the international rule of law is being tom 
between legal and political reasoning. This creates two different 
versions of its content, and those become even more split in the 
conditions of the implementation of the international rule of law 
principles into the practice of international law. As a result, 
fragmented and disintegrated, international rule of law loses its 
affinity as a significant theoretical idea and gets more and more 
shifted to the sphere of political argumentation.
These two positions — instrumentalism and postmodernism — 
despite being differently grounded, have a lot in common. They 
dismiss the idea of the international rule of law because it does not 
meet those solid intagliated arguments that domestic constitutionalism 
uses to justify the concept of legality. Hence, it is merely impossible to 
bring the international rule of law to the same methodological point, 
and this supposedly undermines its relevance for the theory and 
practice of international law. Its fate is to be a rather political myth 
that exists to justify international politics.
Formal Shelter fo r  the International Rule o f Law. Meanwhile, 
the applicability of the rule of law logic in the international legal 
system can be justified by bringing it to the point of formalism 
methodology. To constitute the formal vision of the rule of law and 
determine its place in international legal theory it is necessary to 
distinguish the instrumental and non-instrumental rules and discover 
how the latter restrict international politics (1). Such a task also 
requires answering the question of whether the uncertainty of 
international law is such that it disables any rule-of-law considerations 
at the international level (2). Finally, if the international rule of law 
needs to be taken formally, its connection to the idea of legality should 
be established (3).
Non-Instrumentalism and the Limits o f Politics. Notwithstanding 
the political character of international law, it is crucial to underline
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that not every rule either in domestic or international law can be 
considered as instrumental, and that undermines the idea of 
international law's total submission to political reasoning. In its 
essence, the concept of the rule of law implies that the law is primary 
a system of non-instrumental rules. Legal philosophy considers the 
non-instrumental rules as the rules that were established to express the 
general principles of the organization of a certain social system, and 
do not rely upon individually pursued goals. The rule of law defines 
the idea that a legal system consists of clear and certain non­
instrumental rules that regulate the procedure of creation and 
application of the law. In essence, non-instrumental rules can be called 
the secondary rules in Hart's terminology. Thus, non-instrumental 
(secondary) rules allow international law to resist political expediency 
by restricting rule-making to procedural limits. As T. Reinold grounds, 
secondary rules "legitimize, but at the same time constrain, the 
exercise of political power. [...] In secondary rule-making the stakes 
are even higher than in primary rule-making, because the former 
determine in the first place who has a say in shaping the latter.” [11, p. 
275] So, if primary rules in international law can be seen as an 
outcome of political compromise, it would be a mistake to use the 
same logic for secondary rules, which regulate the process of rule- 
making, law-enforcement, outline the jurisdictions, etc. The mere 
existence of the secondary rules means that international politics is 
restricted mainly by the necessity to confront these rules.
The argument of political expediency also fails because it does 
not explain the possibility of the rule of law at the domestic level. 
Indeed, even the deliberative democracies cannot always guarantee 
absolute transparency in the interactions of political and legal systems 
during decision-making As R. Puntam has shown in his two-level 
analysis theory, at the national level, domestic groups pursue their 
interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, 
and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those 
groups. At the international level, national governments seek to 
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while 
minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments [12, p.
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434]. However, it does not mean that domestic politics tramples down 
the requirements of the rule of law, as political decision-making only 
partly depends on legal means. The same applies for international law 
and international politics: however deep their interosculation is, they 
can still exist as two discourses that limit and define each other. In 
other words, if political expediency were an argument that is powerful 
enough to dismiss the idea of the international rule of law, it should 
have done the same at the domestic level. However, it is not. It all 
depends on the qualities of the particular legal system, whether it is 
stable and authoritative enough to hold out against politics. That 
means, as R. McCorquodale says, that rule of law is not an 'all-or- 
nothing' concept, as it is always a question of extent [4, p. 296].
The other noticeable argument is given by I. Hurd when he shows 
the implication of the idea of the international rule of law in its 
opposition to political realism. Considering the legal grounds for the 
USA's external policy, he argues that despite the fact that the USA 
often violated international law, it did not mean that they ignored it. 
Every action in international affairs requires justification, because "the 
international legality of an act depends on which state undertakes it, 
and what that state says about the act, and what it has previously said 
about its relationships to the pieces international law that may apply” 
[13, p. 42]. I. Hurd also emphasizes that the constraining effect of 
international law means that, "if legal sources can be found to 
legitimate the policy, its passage is smoothed; where they cannot be, 
the policy is at minimum more controversial and perhaps off the table 
entirely” [13, p. 48].
Although, it seems that I. Hurd tends to substitute the concept of 
the international rule of law with the idea of international law itself. 
Limiting politics and establishing the very basic rules of behavior is 
what law does, that is what it had been set up for. Here, one uses the 
descriptive approach (‘law guides actions and limits the behavior’). 
Whereas the rule of law requires the prescriptive approach (‘law must 
confront to the specific requirements’). Even though the rule of law 
does not mean the rule of a good law [14, p. 211], it is still important 
to distinguish these two types of legal propositions. The fact that states
42
somehow adjust their behavior with international law proves only that 
international law exists. Contrary to this, the rule of law does not 
prescribe the obligatory character of specific actions, but it prescribes 
what international law should act like. In other words, "the 
international rule of law should not be confused with the existence of, 
and compliance with, substantive international law obligations'’ [4, 
P-292].
Despite this, the core idea that I. Hurd stands for is quite simple: 
in its limitation of international politics the international rule of law 
reveals itself as a specific paradigm of international relations, which 
opposes the rule of force. In its gist, the international rule of law 
underlines such an international order that is generally more 
foreseeable and reliable than such is based on the rule of force.
The Issue o f Uncertainty. Besides the problem of political 
expediency, another frequently noted issue that supposedly make the 
rule of law idea hardly found at the international level is that of 
uncertainty. One of the common claims against the international rule 
of law is that international law does not consist of rules that provide a 
certain and defined model of behavior. The problem of international 
law's uncertainty, of course, can be put otherwise, for instance, as Jorg 
Kammerhofer does. From his point of view, one should distinguish 
carefully epistemological and ontological uncertainty. The first one is 
connected to the inherent limits as to how well we can perceive law, 
which can hinder us from knowing whether a proposed norm is a 
norm of international law. The second one comes to the direct 
question of what happens when international law itself is, or when its 
rules themselves are, problematic, for instance, when there are 
normative conflicts [15, p. 3-4].
Uncertainty of international law naturally leads to difficulties in 
its enforcement and impacts its efficiency. In the rule-of-law discourse 
the issue of uncertainty arises, among others, in the relative character 
of compliance. Individual states have the capacity to change the legal 
status of their behavior — from illegal to legal, from violation to 
compliance — by the exercise of their legal and political agency [16, 
p. 378], which means that potentially every state can have a unique set
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of obligations under the same treaty. It undermines one of the basic 
requirements of the rule of law: that laws should be public, stable and 
equally applied.
Although law's uncertainty is a problem only if the legal system 
does not have the instruments for overcoming such uncertainty, those 
are mainly the legal interpretation and the application of law. One can 
evaluate these instruments as efficient or inefficient, depending on the 
features of a specific legal order, but they still constitute part of the 
legal reasoning, otherwise the law would have been inapplicable. 
Uncertainty of the law cannot be defined as the main obstacle for the 
rule of law, as it may be overcome. It works both at the domestic and 
international levels, as far as the application of law always requires 
discovering its meaning and relevance for a concrete case. So, by 
‘using’ the law (e.g., by exploiting it as a rule, obeying or enforcing 
it), actors determine its content and overcome its uncertainty at the 
same time. Sometimes the clarification of rules requires their 
interpretation, sometimes even their breaching. Robert Goodin notices 
that in the case of customary international law, “[i]n the absence of 
any formal amendment procedure, the only way [...] for states to 
‘propose an amendment’ to customary law is by breaking that 
customary law,” [17, p. 231] which is also a moment of clarification 
of the content of the customary rule.
In such a way, although the uncertainty can even be called an 
inherent feature of international law, it does not affect the applicability 
of the rule of law logic to it. Every legal system has some level of 
uncertainty that ensues from the fact that the rules must be applicate in 
a deductive manner that requires its clarification. This clarification can 
be made with or without the use of rule of law considerations, but 
uncertainty per se is not an insurmountable barrier for the rule of law.
The International Rule o f Law and Legality. Apparently, the 
international dimension of the rule of law comes to life when 
international law is seen as a system of formalized rules that opposes 
lawlessness, and here one may meet the purely Hobbesian reasoning 
used by states in limiting their prerogatives in exchange for the 
prerogatives of others being limited likewise. In this particular sense,
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the international rule of law arises as a formal structure, which is 
firmly connected with the principles of international law. Here, 
discussions about the international rule of law should not be reduced 
only to questions of how international law and international politics 
correlate, or how legal uncertainty must be dealt with; they rather 
should be focused around the virtues that international law should 
possess to be effective. Jeremy Waldron reasonably emphasizes that,
"asking about the rule of law in the international arena is not just 
asking whether there is such a thing as international law, or what it is, 
or what we think of particular treaties (such as human rights 
covenants), or of the value of customary international law, or of the 
enforceability of international law in our own courts. The phrase 'the 
rule of law' brings to mind a particular set of values and principles 
associated with the idea of legality” [18, p. 25].
Indeed, regarding the international rule of law theoretically, it 
should be admitted that the efficiency of law is determined by two 
basic factors. Firstly, a law must be recognized by the ruled as 
binding; and secondly, it must have the minimum degree of 
conformity to the mle of law principles, i.e., to the principles that 
constitute the very content of legality. It is also possible to describe 
normative thinking about the international rule of law, using the 
distinctive features of the international legal system. That is what 
Patrick Robinson does, when he says: “[notwithstanding the
disorganization of the international legal order and the lack of 
universal acceptance of many international legal standards, there are 
three norms of international law which are generally agreed to have 
universal application. The first are consensual agreements between 
states — that is, treaties — which are governed by the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda. The other two are customary international law 
and jus cogens” [19, p. 34].
Such a formal, or even legalistic shelter for the international rule 
of law, however reasonable it seems, may bring this concept to the 
utopian edge of international legal theory. The international mle of 
law being derived from international law itself, takes the risk of 
becoming merely a part of ‘high’ legal philosophy. Nevertheless, it
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does not mean that the international rule of law must be perceived 
from a moral perspective. This concept is rather an outcome of the 
attempts of theorizing the normative structure of international law, and 
from this side the formalism can serve as the starting point for the 
international rule of law justifications.
Conclusion. The importance of the concept of the rule of law is 
difficult to overestimate. It is not only a significant achievement of 
contemporary legal philosophy, or an acquisition of the theory of 
constitutionalism. Generally speaking, the rule of law is a concept that 
integrates and embodies the inherent principles and axioms of legal 
thinking. The development of domestic legal systems and the 
international legal system led to the rise of two different versions of 
the rule of law, that have distinct manifestations but share a mutual 
core. This core is an idea of authority of law, which means its 
consistency and reliability as a system of regulation.
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